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IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE
STATE OF UTAH

STATE OF UTAH,
Plaintiff-Respondent,
Case No.
-vs-

16532

ELOY PAUL LOPEZ,
Defendant-Appellant.

STATE11ENT OF THE NATURE OF THE CASE
The appellant was tried and convicted of the crime
of Murder in the Second Degree, in violation of Utah Code
Ann.

§

76-5-203 (b)

and (c)

(1953), as amended, in the Third

JudiciaL District Court, in and for Salt Lake County, State
cf

C~ah,

the Honorable Bryant H. Croft, Judge, presiding.
DISPOSITION IN THE LOWER COURT
The trial court entered a judgment of guilty of

Murder in the Second C'egree, and subsequently committed the
appellant to the Utah State Prison for the term provided by
law, five years to life.
RELIEF SOUGHT 0!' J:..PPEAL
Respondent seeks

affi~.ation

of the judgment of

c;uil t::· as rendered by the lovier court.
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
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STATEMENT OF FACTS
On November 10, 1977, appellant went to the Drift
Inn Bar in Lark, Utah, where he drank a few beers and some
liquor (R.264,270,292,350,489).

Approximately 20 to 30

minutes later, Lynn Oliver arrived at the bar
engaged appellant in conversation (R.494).

(R. 491), and

Eventually, they

discussed a fight appellant had been involved in two weeks
earlier (R.496).
fight

An argument ensued

(R.289-290,321,356,496-499).

which evolved into a
They wrestled around,

threw punches at each other, and each ended up on top of
the other at one time cr another

(R.290-291,500).

were then thrown out the back door by the bartender

They
(R.266,

499-501).
The fight continued outside, several observers
peering periodically through the back window of the bar
(R.293,312,324,338,358).

One of the observers, Kim Horrocks,

went outside to the parking lot when the fight was ongoing
(R. 360,379,381).

She i:nmediately observed the victim,

Lynn Oliver, falling

(H.361,38l-382), but was distracted

momentarily by a hio:sing noise
her attention to the ~ight,

(R.36l).

Upon returning

she observed Oliver lying on the

ground (R.36l), and then watcned appellant walk over to
Oliver and kick him in the head

(R.363,383).

Appellant

then stepped back and again kicked Oliver in the head
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
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(R.364,368).

l'.ppellantwaswearing work boots equipped with

a steel toe at the time he kicked the victim (R.392-393,487,515).
The victim went into convulsions.

Blood was coming out

of the front of his head and he was gasping for air (R.297298).

Appellant then began to administer mouth-to-mouth

resuscitation (R.297).

The victim was then taken inside

the bar to await arrival of the paramedics.
When the paramedics arrived, Oliver was comatose
and was having a difficult time breathing (R.402).

He

was transported to a hospital where he was treated for
brain damage by Dr. John Sanders (R.279-286,46l-469).
treatment was unsuccessful.

The

The victim had ceased to

breathe on his own and was thus placed on a respirator
(R. 282).

Two EEG's were performed to evaluate brain

activity (R. 283,462).
a~d

that the

~62-465).

viet~"

T~e

results showed no brain activity,

was neurologically dead (R.458-460,

Subsequently, the life support machines were

turned off and the patient expired
Testi~ony

(R.464-465).

at trial revealed that although

several people viewed many stages of the fight, Kim
Sorrocks was the only person who viewed Oliver getting
~icKed
S~e

in tje head

(R.29~-297,326,330,339-340,3590366,367-380).

further testified that appellant had told her prior to

t.:lt:: flcht t:-Jat ne v,;as

' 1 loo~:ing for

troublen

(R.352-353) .

During
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the course of the fight, Ms. Horricks heard Oliver tell
appellant that he did not want to fight, but just wanted
to be friends

(R.357,378).

Ms. Horrocks also stated

that it was the appellant who was "pressing" the fight
the entire time and that he grabbed the victim by the
shirt and dragged him out the back door to finish the
fight

(R.378,379).

Once outside in the back parking

lot, the victim appeared to be the one always retreating
(R. 359,379).
Several witnesses testified regarding the
appellant's mood and condition prior to the fight as
well as the victim's physical condition following the
fight.

Anthony Vasquez stated that appellant and the

victim were drinking but not drunk prior to the fight,
although appellant seened to have a "slight buzz" on

(R.334).

He also stated that following the fight he observed a cut
which looked like a little hole on the right side of the
victim's head

(R.328)

2s well as "little holes" on the

fore side of his head (R.340).

Candido Abeytc; testified

that he observed scratches on the victim's face following
the fight

(R.299).

Ms. Horrocks stated that the appellant,

prior to the fight, was on his way to being drunk and
did not appear to be in a good mood

(R.385,372).

Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
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Officer Curtis Nielsen of the Salt Lake County
Sheriff's Office testified that when he arrived on the
scene the victim's face was quite bloody (R.389).

He

also stated that he found no dents or blood stains on
an automobile located near the fight
The

para~edics

(R.39l).

testified that upon their arrival

at the Drift Inn Bar, they observed the victim in a
comatose condition (R.402), having a difficult time
breathing

(R.402), and having sustained a number of

abrasions and contusions to the face and head (R.408).
There v,·as also blood and dust on the victim's face
(R. 415).

Fenton Quinn, the paramedic who initially

treated the victim, testified that he observed an
indentation, which looked to him like a
o~

tip
(?.

;ara~edic

He also stated that he told another

t~at

been kicked

redlrec~

~:·

him

~~at

or

a boot, in the right side of the victim's head

-±03-LlO~).

~ad

footpri~t

it looked to
(R.404).

exa~1nation

hi~

as though the victim

It Kas brought out on

of Mr. Quinn that these observations

(Quinn) were made prior to his hc.ving been informed

~~e

victin had indeed been kicked in
~ treat~~g

ph~·sician,

Dr.

t~e

head (R.410).

John Sande=s, testified

::-:.c.t ~.2.s o!Jservation o: t:-1e \l'ict.i::. revealeC. certain
~~~~~c~c~istics \{~:ch deno~ed

severe inju~~- to the victim's

Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
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This damage was responsible for the

brain stem (R.279).

failure of the victim to breathe property, since the
respiration center is located in the brain stem (R. 2822 83).

The failure of the brain stem and its components

to function properly was caused by undue and increased
pressure, bruising, or a combination of both (R.282-283).
Dr. Sanders also stated that the victim had sustained a
basal skull fracture

This was diagnosed due to

(R.280).

the presence of blood coming out of the victim's left ear
(R. 280).

It was his supposition that the victim had

sustained head

tra~~a,

which in turn was responsible for the

victim's neurological status

(R.280).

Dr. Hebertson, a neurologist who specializes in
reading EEGs, testified

tha~

he read two EEGs

performed on

the victim and it \\as his synopsis that there was no evidence
of "on-going cerebral electrical cortical activity, i.e.,
the higher

ca~ters

of the brain were not producing nor

reflecting any signs of electrical activity (R.458).
information was given to Dr.

This

Sanders, who stated at trial

that it was his medical opinion that the victim's brain
wad dead and that the patient had no chance for a
neurological recovery (R.458,463).

The victim was then

taken off the respirator due to the fact that he demonstrat~
no spontaneous brain

f~nctions

to repair those fc:y-,ctions

(?.

and nothing could be done

464-465).
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Deputy State Medical Examiner, Terry H. Rich,
testified that he was the pathologist who performed the
autopsy on the victim (R.419-420), that he observed
multiple abrasions on the head and face of the victim
(R.421), and observed two fractures of the skull and
a significant subdural hemorrhage underneath the skull
between the bone on top of the brain tissue (R.424-426).
He also observed areas of contusion of the skull along the
frontal lobes and temporal lobes along the base (R.426 1

•

The autopsy also revealed that there was extensive hemorrhage
on the brain stem, which would have caused cessation of the
respiratory and heart centers, causing death

(R.426).

Dr.

Rich traced the cause of death to the trauma which caused the
fractures of the skull, and stated that the trauma which
caused the skull to fracture also caused a swelling of the
brain.

This swelling, coupled with subdural hemorrhage,

causeci pressure inside of the cr=.nial vault which causes a
p1nching down of the spinal cord and midbrain ponds.

The

brain stern area could also have been pushed down to the
spinal canal, causing a lack of oxygen and a secondary
:-.er:torrhage.

This lack of oxygen

the l:::_fe function
Dr.

t~en

caused a cessation of

(R. :,27).

Rich further stated that the force or trauma

~:jich c2used t~e ~rac~ure5 came

fro~ two separate directions
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(R.427-428), and that the nature of the injuries and the
forces causing them were consistent with the victim
having been kicked twice by a boot; once from the left
side of his head, and once on his forehead

(R.427-429).

At trial, the appellant admitted he became
involved in an argument with Oliver concerning a fight
appellant had had two weeks earlier with a Don Waltz
(R.496).

He admitted a fight ensued with Oliver, but

claimed he could not remember many of the details of the
argument or fi9ht due to alleged intoxication (R.496).
However, he denied ever kicking Oliver in the head
When asked

whet~e~

(R.519).

or not he saw Lhe victim's head hit

anything as he was falling during the fight, appellant
responded, "I don't know what he hit"

(R.523).

He did

ac'.rnit wearing safety boots .:i th a steel toe on the night
in question

(R.515).

On direct examination, appellant was questioned
by his counsel about the fight which he had been involved
in two weeks prior to l'ovember lC,
cross-ex~~ination,

l977

(R.492,496).

On

the appellant described some of the

detd.ils of that fight

(E.

Waltz fell to the ground.

516-519).

He stated that Donny

When asked if he had any

recollection of having kicked \·;al tz in t:1e head on that
occasion, appellant responded necatively

(R.5l8-519).
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The prosecution on rebuttal offered the testimony
of Janice Ortega, a bartender at the Drift Inn Bar (R.553).
She testified that the day after the Oliver fight she went
to the hospital to check on the victim. Upon returning, she
stopped at the Drift Inn Bar.
(R. 554).

The appellant was present

She informed Merle Watson that "they didn't think

that Lynn [Oliver] was going to make it"
time the appellant responded,

(R.555).

At that

"Well, what if he does?

I'm going to get is a year in jail for manslaughter''

All

(R. 555).

Ms. Ortega was also questioned about appellant's
earlier fight with Donny Waltz.

She testified that on that

night she was tending bar, witnessed the fight, and
saw appellant kick Donny Waltz in the head

(R.SSS-557),

hppellant's counsel then pursued more details of the fight
on cross-examination

(R.558-564).

Finally, Merle Watson, also a bartender at the
Jrift Inn

(R.260), testified that three or four days following

the fatal incident, he heard appellant "bragging about
kill inc; a man

(victim) with his ovm hands"

(R. 268).

ARGUMENT
POINT I
~HE TRIAL COURT DID l-<OT COMMIT ERROR IN
;..J!HTTING EVIDEt\'CE OF ACTS OTHER THAN THE
OC:E FOR lmiCH APPELLA-1\JT \"lAS TRIED.

~he

appellant testified in his own behalf that

Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
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of the fight betweeD the two men, and that the fight arose
out of an argument over a previous fight that had occurred
two weeks earlier between the appellant and another
individual named "Donny"

(R. 492).

Some of the details

of the earlier fight were brought out on direct examination
by appellant's counsel:

Q.
A.
Q.
A.
Q.
A.

Q.

A.

Had you met Donny before?
Yes.
Where had you met him?
In the Drift Inn about maybe
two weeks before that.
Under what circumstances did you
meet Donny on that occasion?
Well, I walked into the bar with
my brother of mine and a friend of
mine named Dan, and apparently it was
Dan's girlfriend.
I was standing there
and he pulled a knife out on me.
I
said, "\'/hat are you doing that for?
I don't even know you." And then that
is when Lynn [victim of the case at bar]
took the knife away from him.
After Lynn took the knife away from
him, then what happened?
I walked over by the pool tables of the
Drift Inn and he \.Janted to fight.
So we h;:
a iight at the Drift Inn, Donny anc I. bu~
that was over right away.
Ana Lynn took
him home and '>'>'e left.
(R. 4 9 2).

On cross-examination, the prosecutor sought to
develop the details of the earlier fight:
Q.

A.

c.

Mr. Yengich [counsel for appellant] has.
talked to \"OU about a fiqht vou had witn
one Donnv l\laltz.
I believe ~·ou said you
didn't k;m\,' Donnv verv well but vou haC bee·
in a fight a couple of weeks bef~re this
even at the ~rift In~?
Yes, Slr.
1"/!m vias then= ·,;hen you had t:-,a t fight
v:i th hlr-.?
brother Lo·c:is.

I

-.... ::..n~: Roy Ort~gc. v:a.s
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Q.
A.
Q.

other person?
::..yr:n Oliver was there. Dan lvadsworth
was t~ere from West Jordan, and that
is all I can recall.
Had you been drinking that night?
Yes.
Do you remember what you were drinking?
Yes.
l·ihat?
Beer.
Very much?

•'1..

l~o.

Q.

Your claim was that Donny pulled a knife
on you?
Yes, sir.
And Lynn took the knife away fror:-. !".i::c?
Yes, sir.
\·lould you describe for me ac;ai:-. .,·:-.a::
kind of a fight you had ,,-i th :~im c.:"::er ::he
k::1ife [-,ad been taken av.-ay fro:n him?

A:1y

Q.
Q.

Q.
h..

Q.

_:. ._ fist fight.

]-_.

Describe it for me.
Kind of a blow-for-blow?
It was only--not even maybe three or four
blov.·s.
v;ho hit v.·horn?
Pc.rdon?
Did you hit him?
Yes, sir.

Q.

Ho\\' many times?

Q.
Q.
?..

Q.

r,

""
A.
Q.

Once.
Did he hit you?
Yes.
:lo..,...- mar-1 v times?
I don't.know.
Maybe
to hit him still.
I
b~oke

Q.

Q.

once or twice.
I tried
hit the steel pole and

ny hand.

Did either one of you ever go to the ground?
Yes.
Did either one of you fall to the ground?
Yes.
·,.;:-.ich c:~e?
Do:-cn:,· C.id.
1\-:-"a.t C.i.C ::z·ou do?
l·;hc.:: did I do \·:'len he wc.s on the ground?
Just let him get up.
Do ~ou have any recollection of having
}:~c~e~ ~i~ in the head?
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A.
No, sir.
Mr. Yengich:
I object and ask that be
stricken.
I ask that we move for a
mistrial.
Counsel has asked a question
like that and there is no good faith
repetition.
The Court: The answer is no and the answer
may remain, and the motion is denied.
Q.
(By Mr. VanDam):
Your testimony is
you did not kick him at all; is that what
I heard?
A.
Yes.
Mr. Yengich:
The question was asked and
answered.
The Court: Cross-examination.
The Witness:
Yes.
Q.
(By Mr. VanDam):
You did not kick him?
A.
I did not kick him.
Q.
Or attempt to kick him?
A.
No, sir.
(R. 516-519).
In rebuttal, the prosecution called Janice Ortega,
a bartender at the Drift Inn, who testified over
appellant's objection,

on the earlier occasion of the

~hat

fight between appellant and "Donny" she had observed the
appellant kick "Donny" while he lay on the ground:
Q.

A.
Q.
A.
Q.

A.
Q.
i:...
Q.
M~.

On that date, did you have occasion
to see a man by the name of Donny
\~al tz?
Yes.
Did you see a man named Eloy Lopez?
Yes.
What ~e~e you doing that night?
I was working that night.
Did you see a fight that night in the
bar?
Yes.
Will you describe that fight, please?
Yengich:
Objec~ion to any description
of the fight as not relevant to the
issue before the Court.
Ke are talking
abou~ an alterca~ion on the lOth of
~\

~!1E

O'"Jer.lbe r.

2ourt:

~~ll,

~aL~:ing

about:·

~~ic~

~ig~~~

a~e

~·ou
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The

Mr.

The

Q.

A.
Q.
A.

Hr.

The
Q.
A.

The
Q.

fight which Mr. Lopez said he did not
use his fist.
That is the one.
Court:
We will let her answer some
questions concerning the fight that
she can testify to that was about two
weeks before.
Yengich:
Your Honor, we will object
to their characterization of the fight.
He knows the date; we would suggest to
the Court that characterization was only
meant to inflame the jury, and it was
improper, and ask the jury to be admonished
about that.
Court:
I don't think his question was
improper or intended to do an:;'th:'_,,q of the
kind.
It has been describe~, ~he people,
the two men had a fight a couple oi: v:eeks
before.
That is what he is asking her.
(By Mr. Marson):
Can you describe that
right, Janice?
I didn't see what happened to start it.
I
was at the other end of the bar.
Describe it from the point you saw it.
What
did you see?
I seen Donny fall down and I did see Eloy
[appellant] kick him.
Donny ha~ his arms
up around his head.
Yengich:
Object.
It is onlv prejudicial.
It is in violation of Rule 45 of Utah
rules of evidence.
There is no necessity
of proving something like this for any
issue under the rules of evidence in the
State of Utah.
We would object and ask
it be stricken.
There is no purpose for
any iss-ue under the rules of evidence in the
State of Utah.
We would object and ask it
be stricken.
There is no purpose for it.
Court:
The motion to strike is denied.
(By ML 'larson):
You saw him kick him?
Yes.
Court:
That is what she testified to.
(E~' Hr. '1arso;c):
\\-hat did you see?
I seen Donny laying down and Eloy was
kicking him.
(R.555-557).
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Appellant claims in his brief that the prosecutor
introduced "evidence of another criminal act in order to
discredit the appellant generally as well as to impeach
appellant's testimony that he did not kick Lynn Oliver on thE
occasion of which the instant charge arose"
Brief, pp. 5-6, 8-9).

(Appellant's

He further alleges that "the purpose

of introducing the details of the incident was to mislead
the jury to the conclusion that appellant was an evil or bad
person, one who is quarrelsome and likely to resort to dead!;'
weapons witho;Jt justification"

(Appellant's Brief, p.

13)

(emphasis added).
Appellant argues that receipt of evidence regardinc
the earlier fight was a violation of Rules 55 and 47 of the
Utah Rules of Evidence, and that the trial court abused its
discretion in failing to exclude such evidence,

thereby

violating Rule 45, U.R.E.
Respondent submits that cross-examination and reb,::
evidence regarding the prior fight was proper and justi£iabl:
received by the trial court pursuant to the following theoriE

SAID EVIDE!,C:S \'il-5 hiTHIJ\i THE
AKD SCO?E OF PROPER CROSSEx;.J,:Il\ATIOF.

RU~ES

Evidence of the earlier fight was initially
introduced on direct exa~inatio~

appell2.nt's counsel

(R. 492).
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On cross-examination counsel for the State merely
pursued the details of the fight such as "who hit who,"
what kind of a fight was involved

(R.516-519), and whether

appellant kicked Waltz in the head during the fight (R.518519).
The rules of cross-examination are clearly set
forth in this state.

Utah Code Ann.

§

77-44-5

(1953), as

amended, states in relevant part:
If a defendant offers himself as
a witness, he may be cross-examined by
the counsel for the state the same as any
other witness.
The Section of the former Code

(Section 5015, Comp. Laws

1907) verbatim in relevant part to Section 77-44-5 was
commented upon by this Court in State v. Vance, 38 Utah l,
110 Pac. 434

(1910):

section 5015 in express terms
provides that the accused, if he becomes a
witness, must be treated on cross-examination
the same as any other witness.
In view of
the provisions of these sections, the test
t!-Je court must keep in mind is: 1·/ould the
particular question be proper cross-examination
if the same were propouncied to any other
witness who had testified to the same facts
that the accused has testified to?
If the
question would be proper cross-exa:nination
if asked of c.rw other 1,·itness it would likewise
be if propounci~ci to one on trial for a criminal
offense, or ¥ice versa.
The rule is that as to
whether the accused has mc.de certain admissions,
or has made statements of material facts against
himselt and everything which may contradict,
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modify, explain, or make clearer, limit or
enlarge the meaning of the statements
made by him while testifying with respect
to any subject of which he has testified,
may be inquired into on cross-examination.
The inquiry must, however, be limited to the
subject-matter gone into by the witness in
his testimony in chief.
. Where the accused,
as a witness, denies that he committed or was
connected with the com~ission of the criminal
act or acts constituting the ofLense for which
he is being tried, the cross-examination
ordinarily must be permitted to extend to the
whole range of facts which in some way are
related to the transaction constituting the
offense.
110 P.2d at 445 (emphasis added).
Several later cases have reaffirmed this principle
holding that areas which an accused opens up for

questioni~

on direct examination are subject to further inquiry on
cross-examination.

State v. Schieving, 535 P.2d 1232 (Utah

1975); State v. Studham, 572 P.2d 700

(Utah 1977).

In the

Schieving case, the defendant wcs found guilty of mishandling
of public

~onies.

At trial, evidence of shortages of

~oney

within defendant's department other than those for which
he was standing tricl were acl.rrit.ted by the trial court over
defendant's objection.

On appeal, his conviction ~as affirm~

and his claim of error regarding cdmission of such evidence
was dismissed:
In this ccse evidence of cnother shortage
\vithin the defendcnt's department was not
prejudic~al, and this is especiallv true in
view of the fact that defendant testified as
to the o~~er shortagE, and it was his
testimo~,. t~~t -~~ro~~r~~ the subject i~~o
Lne
trlc.l.
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney
Law Library.
Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
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In Studham, the defendant was convicted of rape.
One of his grounds of appeal alleged error in allowing
cross-examination on a court order prohibiting the
defendant from visiting the prosecutrix.

In affirming

the conviction, this Court stated:
To the defendant's claim of error in
allowing cross-examination on a court order
prohibiting defendant from visiting the
prosecutrix, the state makes two effective
rejoinders:
First, that the subject was
opened up by defendant's own counsel on
direct examination and thus could nrooerl"
be probed on cross-examination.
Seccnd, L~at
the testimony v;as relevant to inquire abo1..:c:.
the background and relationship between the
parties, relied upon by the defendant
himself as bearing upon the critical issue,
of whether there was consent, or forcible
rape.
572 P.2d at 703

(emphasis added).

In State v.

~lora,

this Court upheld allowing

~::er.ses,
~o

558 P. 2ci 1335 (Utah 1977),
t~e

prosecution on cross-

v.-:--,ere the de::=endant chose on direct examination

show through his testimony that he was not a man of
On direct

cxa~ination

defendant was asked

not only whether or not he had been convicted of a felony
~c~

the date and

-.~,ctr1er

or not

2

t~·pe

of felony.

v.·ecpon v:cs usee

He was also asked
ln

the comrc.ission thereof.
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direct examination testimony that he was not a man of
violence.

The Court upheld such a line of cross-

examination:
Inasmuch as the defendant had chosen
to elicit evidence to show that he was not
a man of violence, that matter became a
legitimate subject of inquiry and
refutation.
Wherefore, the questions
asked by the prosecutor seem reasonably
calculated to bring out facts which
might tend to contradict or weaken the
effect of the defendant's assertion.
558 P.2d at 1336.
Ea~lie~

in its opinion, the Court stated the

applicable rule of law as it now stands in Utah:
When a defendant offers himself as a
witness, he may properly be subjected to the
tests of credibility, by questioning him in the
same manner and to the same extent as any other
witness, as to any matter which would tend to
contradict, weaken, or modify the effect of
his direct examination.
558

P.2~

at 1336.
The record in the present case clearly indicates

that appellant, throuqh his counsel,

opened up the issue

on eli rect examination regarding the fight betv1een himself
and Donny Waltz
propounded on

(R.492).

The subsequent questions

cross-exa~inatio~

state regarding details

o~

by counsel for the

the fight,

including

whet~er

or not during the fis;:-:t appella:1t Licked Dor:ny \':al tz
in the head, were well within the boundaries of proper
cross-examination.

The

were directly relatec tc

~uestions

t~,e

lssue

asked

c:

b~·

the prosecutor

t!1e flc "t bro__jur;ht
j
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out on direct examination.
Finally, it is a long-standing rule of this Court
that matters of cross-examination and the extent thereof
rest

largely within the discretion of the trial judge.

This Court will reverse only if an abuse of that discretion
is shown.

State v.

Starks, 581 P.2d 1015 (Utah 1978);

State v. Curtis, 542 P.2d 744

(Utah 1975); State v.

Anderson, 27 Utah 2d 276, 495 P.2d 804

(1972).

Eve"l if

an error .is made in limiting or extending the bou...'1ds
of cross-examination, it is not to be reversed unless it is
also shown to be prejudicial.
v. Maestas,

State v. Starks, surpa; State

564 P. 2d 1386 (Utah 1977).

Respondent submits that the cross-examination was
?roper as it related to the subject matter introduced on
oirect examination.
o~

Furthermore, no abuse of discretion

the part of the trial judge has been shown.
B

SAID EVIDENCE iiJ..S J..D~liSSIBLE TO
PROVE A ~Q.TERIAL FACT PU?.SUANT TO
~ULE 55 OF THE UTAH RULES OF
L:VIDENCE.
Rules 55 of the Utah Rules of Evidence states:
Subject to Rule 47 evidence that a
person con.P1i tteo a crine or civil hTong on
a

S?eci~ieC

occ~sion,

is

inaG~issijle

to

prove hls disposition to co~"it crime or
ci\·il ~:r~~g as ~he ~~sis for a~ inference
t~~.at

:-~.t:_: corn..:.i ~ted ano-ther crime or civil
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wrong on another specified occasion but,
subject to Rules 45 and 48 such evidence
is admissible when relevant to orove some
other material fact including absence of
mistake or accident, motive, opportunity,
intent, preparation, plan, knowledge or
identity."
(Emphasis added.)
Appellant asserts that admission of evidence of
specific details of the fight between appellant and Don
Waltz particularly testimony relating to the appellant
kicking Watz in the head, is violative of Rule 55, as it
did not fall within any of the exceptions mentioned and
was introduced to

nc~

only inflame the jury, but to show

that appellant had a propensity to commit this type of
crime.
Respondent submits that such evidence was
admissible to prove (l) a material fact other than those
mentioned in the exceptions under Rule 55;

(2) modus

operandi.
Case law ln Utah clearly states that generally
speaking, evidence of other crimes is not admissitle
if its sole purpose is to disgrace the defendant as a
person of evil chc.racter \·,'i th a propensity to commit
crime and thus likely to have committed the crime chargee.
State v. Johnson, 25 Utah 2d 160, 478 P.2d 491

(1970).

There are numerous cases, however, which have made
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exception to that general rule.

Such exception has been

made based upon one of the exceptions listed in Rule 55
or at times based upon other reasons relevant to the
issue being tried.
1978)

State v. Daniels, 584 P.2d 880 (Utah

(evidence relevant to explain the circumstances

surrounding the instant crime is admissible for that
purpose, though it tends to connect defendant with
another crime); State v. Brown, 577 P.2d 135 (Utah 1978)
(evidence of commission of other crimes admissible to
prove knowledge, intent, and modus operandi);
Cauble, 563 P.2d 775 (Utah 1977)

State -,-.

(evidence of other crimes

adraitted to show intent); State v. Underwood, 25 Utah 2d 234,
479 P. 2d 794

(1971)

(evidence of commission of other

crimes is relevant where it is an integral part of competent,
relevant evidence of the crime charged); see also State v.
E2ran, 25 Utah 2d 16, 474 P. 2d 728
Scott, 175 P.2d 1016

(1970); and State v.

(Utah 1947).

Respondent submits that evidence of details of
t~e

earlier fight, adduced on cross-examination and rebuttal

testimony, were relevant to prove a "material fact" under
?.l2~e

J..i=pellant had denied kicking the victim, Lynn

55.

('live~,

in

re~ard1ng
t~e

t~e

case at bar.

The crux

of the State's case

tje second degree murder charge revolved around

issue as to wjether ai=pellant kicked the victim in the
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witnessed appellant kick the deceased twice in the head
with his steel-toe boot
515).

(R.363-364,368,383,392-393,487,

Appellant denied ever having kicked the deceased,

though he could offer no explanation as to how the victim
got in the state he was in (comatose) following the fight.
Thus, the issue was whether the victim was kicked in the
head by the appellant.
lying or

~as

In other words, was appellant

the eyewitness, Kim Horrocks, lying.

Such

a determination was crucial to the outcome and disposition
of the case.

}illy

relevant testimony which would tend to

help the jury decide this material fact would be helpful.
When appellant on direct examination introduced
the issue of the earlier

£ight it then became relevant

on cross-examination to ascertain whether appellant's modus
operandi in that particular fight was to kick his opponent
in the hec.d.

When he denied

hc.~ing

kicked Waltz in the

head, the prosecution then presented an eyewitness
Ortega)
in fact

(Janis

on rebuttal exarr,ination who testified that she did
~itness

the appellant kick Waltz in the head

(R.556-557). The issue then becomes two fold:
appellant would lie about kicking
one fight

so~eone

( l)

·.c

l~

in the head in

(assuming c:he state's v,·it:Jesses "'ere believed
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.

by the JUry),

l

would he not lie about kicking the deceased

in the head in the case at bar.

Such a determination is

of course, as previously mentioned, crucial to a resolution
of the charge of second degree murder in this case;

(2)

is it the modus operandi of the appellant to kick with his
feet when involved in fights?
Certainly evidence of kicking in the prior fight
is admissible as an exception to prove modus opera:cdi
Rule 55.

State v. Brown, 577 P.2d at 136.

·_:~,-:~r

In BrO\,u, tne

defendant was convicted of theft and selling a motor vehicle
with altered vehicle identification.
a prior,

Rebuttal evidence of

unrelated offense involving theft and sale of a

stolen auto and an attempt to conceal those crimes by
replacing parts of

t~e

stolen automobile bearing vehicle

ide:; t if ica tion mlinber s with parts fror:J a v:recked auto
purchased by defendant, was admitted as being relevant to
show similar facts revealing modus operandi.

1

(a)
~hat this Court views the evidence and all reasonable
inferences v.'"~~ch ::1ay be drav.-n therefrom in the light most
favorable to the jc:ry's verdict, see State v. Helm, 563
P.2d 794 (Cteh 1977); State v. Jones, 554 P.2d 1321 (Utah
1976); State\'. Sinclair, lS Utah 2d 162, 389 P.2d 465 (1964).
(b)
As to tne es c:rnpt~on thet the jury believed those aspects
of the evid~~ce ~ ich su2~ort their verdict and survey the
eccrd o~ appeal
~ t~at-ii~~~, see State v. Harless, 23
tah 2d 128, ..,59
.2d ::'10 (l969); St=.te v. Hov1ard, 544 P.2d

66

(L'tah 1915).
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Returning to the argument regarding the admissibility
of the kicking incident on rebuttal in order to prove a
"material fact" under Rule 55,

2

respondent calls the attention

of the Court to recent case law involving similar factual
contexts.
In State v. Green,

578 P.2d 512

(Utah 1978),

defendant was convicted of selling narcotic drugs.

He

denied that he had seen the undercover agent who allegedly
purchased drugs from him on the date charged.

On cross-

examination the defendant stated that he had not seen the
undercover agent since August 2 (the crime for which he was
tried occurred August 3).

On rebuttal, over defendant's

objection, the undercover agent described a sale made to
her by defendant on August 2.

She also testified that the

defendant had often sold her drugs in the past.
conviction

~as

The

upheld and the prior sale was ruled to

have been properly admltted:
. if evidence serves some
legitimate purpose as to proof of the
crime, or in bearing on the credibility of
evidence, the fact that it may show the
corrunission of another crime will not render
it admissible.

2

See Note at end of Rule 55, Rules of Evidence - As Adopte~
"The generaL;
accepted rule prohibits e\·idence of another cri!.\e or Clvll

by the Supreme Court o::' Utah, v:hich states:

v.Trong as proof that a person co!~-:'. .::.t-ceC a crir:~e or civil

T:>e thi:ws sc': forth~-'
[absence of ni tc.Le or ccciCe:-:t, :-'.::t- '.'e,- o~~-crtuni ~y, ~
preparation, p 2..:1, ·~:~o,·.lt_:c:ige, or lGt:::--,~.:.._:_,,-1- c.r~
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Although it is true that one accused
of crime is clothed with a number of
protections; including .
. the right not
to give evidence against himself, if he
chooses to waive the latter right, and
offers himself as a witness, he then
becomes subject to being treated the same
way as any other witness.
This includes
cross-examination on any matter which would
tend to contradict, explain or cast doubt
upon the credibility of his testimony.
Furthermore, any testimony or evidence
which is purposed to those same objectives
may be introduced in rebuttal.
In analyzing the defendant's contention
of error in the light of those rules, it will
be seen that the testimonv of Ms. Gierez
[undercover policewoman], of which the defencant
complains, was in legitimate refutation of his
statements wherein he denied ever having sold
drugs, or of having seen her after August lst,
and his statement that he had not left his home
from the evening of August 2 until after August
3.

578 P.2d at 514
Tl-Je

(emphasis added).
a.nalogy bet,,•een the Green case and the case

at bar is readily apparent, i.e., that in the present case

~~e defe~dant

denied having kicked Waltz in the head.

3

This was rebutted by the state's witness who said she saw
the appellant kick 1·:altz. Suchv;as that factual case in
Green, except tr,e denial there involved selling drugs on a
crior occasion as well as being in the presence or seeing

~

I~

beth the Green case as well as in the case at bar,

che defendantc-aPoellants denied complicity (or relevant
facts r garding ihe co~plicity, i.e., kicking people
in the ead durinc fichts) in the crimes for which they
-.. ere be r.g triecc ~s v.·~ll as prior crimes or bad acts.
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the undercover agent on aE occasion other than the one fo:r ·,1;,1
the defendant was on trial.

In both cases, of course, the

determination as to who to believe was for the jury.
In State v. Jarrell,

608 P.2d 218

(Utah 1980),

defendant was convicted of attempted criminal homicide.

On

direct examination, he was asked questions concerning his
"quasi-military" activities in Southeast Asia for purposes
of showing his physical powers, and, thus, that the "inept"
assault on the victim was committed by someone other than
the defendant.

O:c cross-examination, the State was permittee

to question the

ci<efe,~ldant

regarding his involvement in quasi-

military activities in Africa, specifically, if he had

tak~

part in a kidnapping and if he had killed people while
in Africa.

This was objected to by defendant, but

by the trial court.

overrul~

The Utah Supreme Court upheld the

conviction, sustaining the ruling of the trial judge:
5~cad discretion is allowed in crossexamination of a defendant who has opened
up an area of direct examination.

608 P.2d at 228.
Thus, evidence of the kicking of Kaltz on crossexamination ·~·:c.s aclr:1issible unCer t~e r11ling in State v.
Jarrell,

supra;

anC the r-uling .:.n St2te v~

Green,

suprc,

enables evidence of the kicking broucht out on rebuttal
to be adDissible.
submits,

Such evidence

~:as

not

o~fered,

for t!:.e purpose c: ''2t~c:---,;,~_ins; to s!-JO'v.

as

th2t
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I

....I

to prove a material fact under Rule 55, that fact being
whether appellant was lying when he denied kicking the
victim of this case in the head.

The second fact to

be proved was modus operandi, whether or not this was
the method

(kicking) appellant used when engaging in

fights.
Appellant claims that the evidence of the
kicking on the prior occasion was inflammatory.

Assuming,

arguendo, that the evidence was inflammatory, this
~ot

render it inadmissible due to the fact that it was

relevant and competent.
(Gtah 1979).
in

wou~d

State v. Danker, 599 P.2d 518

The reason for such

a~~issibility

was stated

Dc.C~ker:

The reason .
is that the jury is
entitled to know the truth of the situation
in order to c.rrive at a just verdict; and
notwithstc.nding the prerogative of the court
to exclude evidence, he should onl~ do so if
he thinks it will cause the processes of
justice to go awry.

599 P.2d at 519-520.
Furthermore, the evidence was
:alrness to the State.

The

a~pellant

admi~ted

in proper

absolutely denied

·:;c:-:i:-,:; c.nyone, be it the deceasec': \·icti:r. or l·ialt.z.
;~'cuJd

be

Danifes~l}·

u~f~ir

c~~i~ ~o~-co~plic~t~· es a

State to present a\-2llable

It

to allo~ the appellant to
defense without allowing the
e\ricie~ce

to the contrary .

Such
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reasoning, which respondent submits should be followed in
the present case, was very adequately stated in State v.
Hansen, 588 P. 2d 164, 167

(Utah 1978):

It is within the prerogative of the
legislature to enact rules of evidence;
and it is the duty of the courts to give
them effect.
If that is to be done in
this case, the State should not be
permitted to proceed in its case in
which to introduce evidence of past
offenses or misconduct of the defendant.
However, that is the extent of the
proper application of that statute.
It
[Rule 55] cannot be invoked to thwart
the processes of justice by preventing
the cresentation of anv competent evidence
to rn~e~ any material issue ~aised in the
case.
The prosecution (i.e., the public it
represents) is also entitled to fairness and
justice.
It would be mani:::estly unfair to permit
the defendant to raise [an] issue .
. , then
prevent the prosecution from presenting any
available evidence to the contrary.
Consequently, when it becomes apparent from
the evidence that the defendant is relying
upon [a] defense.
. , the carrving out of
the fund2Dentc.l ?·Jr?ose of the tr::.al, thc.t
of ascertaining tne truth, makes lt both
lo~lcal and necessary that the Stc.te be
allo·"'ed -co !Jresent any evidence in impeachrnc!lt
or rebuttal which would show the defendant's
d::.scosi~ion to cc~wit the crime charqed.
This
is in accordc~ce ~it~ ~~e law as correct!~,
stated ln Rule ~5, [U.R.E.]; and the fact that
this mc.y include prior acts o::: crime or
misconduct would not render such evidence
inadmissitle.
(~~phcsis added.)

cross-examinatio:-~

and rebu::tc.l regarclng appellant J.:ickinc;

Waltz in the head during

t~'1eir

to prove c.

;..::-.Cer :-cle

flc;ht has properly admitted
:,~,

I

:.::s ·v.:ell a:::, to pro\·e

modus operandi ~urs~ant ~G ~h~
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I

I

I
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c
SAID EVIDENCE WAS PROPER TO
IMPEACH APPELLANT'S TESTIMONY
REGARDING A RELEVANT AND MATERIAL
FACT.
Respondent submits that evidence of the kicking
of Don Waltz by appellant was properly admitted for
purposes of impeaching appellant's testimony regarding a
relevant and material fact.
As discussed in Point I-B, supra, a

materia~

:Get

was whether or not appellant kicked the deceased Vlctim
of the present case in the head.

Crucial to that determina-

tion was whether the jury believed appellant, who denied
the kicking, or whether they believed Kim Horrocks, who
witnessed the fight and testified that she did in fact
witness the appellant kick the victim--twice.

Evidence

of a prior fight in which appellant was also involved was
broug~~

out on direct examination of the appellant.

Prior

inquiry by the prosecutor on cross-examination regarding
cetails of the fight led to a question of whether appellant
used

~'1e

sarne modus operandi in the l'laltz fight as he

allegedly used in the fatal fight with Lynn Oliver.
again denying such a
re?arding

~~ether

~odus

Once

operandi, appellant's credibility

he d1d in fact use his feet in the Waltz

ficht became an important issue in this respect:

if
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regarding the same issue for which he is standing trial?

To

attack the denial by appellant regarding the Waltz incident,
a rebuttal eyewitness was presented by the State not to show
that appellant had a propensity to commit crimes by kicking
people in the head (although as shown supra in Point I-B,
such evidence was admissible to show modus operandi), but
to show that he

(appellant) was lying regarding such a modus

operandi in the Waltz case,

~

fortiori,

the jury could now

decide whether or not he was lying in the present case
regarding the same modus operandi.
This Coc.rt has ruled that cross-examination affecting
the accuracy or credibility of a witness's

(defendant or

otherwise) testimony is admissible even though it may shOII'
commission of another crime.

State v. Green, suDra, at 578

P.2d 513-519; State v. Mason,

530 P.2d 795,

797

(Utah 1975).

The question is whether rebuttal evidence is
admissible for
credibility.

t~e

purpose of attacking the appellant's

':':'his Court a:1swered that question af£irmativel:·

in State v. 1•\itchell, 571 P. 2d 1351

In that case,

(Utah 1977).

the defendant was convicted of aggravated robbery.

The

prosecution's evide:1ce showed that the defendant

a~d

companion, armec 11·ith guns, ch2rged into a home,

terrorized

his

the occupants and took cas'J from the victim, Barbara HarrioThe defense presented evidence that no weapo:1s were used,
no cash taken, and that what actcally occurred was two
dissatisfied
and
a
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I

I

I

bag of narcotics

(heroin).

On the witness stand, the victim

Barbara Harris testified that the defendant carried a gun
when he entered the premises.
denied this.

The defendant vigorously

Harris also testified on cross-examination

by defendant's counsel that she had never lied under oath
and that she had not lied at the preliminary hearing, where
she denied she had ever sold heroin

(defendant had claimed

she sold him a "bad bag'' of heroin on the date in question,
thus precipitating his theft of another bag).

Defense

counsel called Darryle Riddle as a rebuttal witness, who
testified that he had worked as an undercover policeman during
September and November of 1975 and that part of his duties
included undercover narcotics purchases.

Upon stating that

he knew the prosecution's witness, Ms. Harris,
re~uested

the prosecution

to voir dire the witness outside the presence of the

jury.
The prosecution determined that on June 20, 1975, the
day

o~

the crime for which defendant was now being tried,

Riddle was not engaged by the police.

A proffer of Riddle's

testimony was offered by defense counsel for the record, viz.,
~e

(Riddle) would testify that he had purchased heroin from

~s.

Harris at her residence on September 29 and October 2

and 3 of 1975.
Defense counsel asserted that he was entitled to
1~pcach her s~2te~ents ~nat she had never sold heroin, pointing
the S.J. Quinney
Law Library.
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occurred, but there was a theft of heroin.
witness insisted there was no heroin.

The prosecution

Defense counsel

therefore urged that in order to receive a fair trial,
defendant was entitled to present evidence that Ms.

Harris

had, in fact, lied.
On appeal, the State relied upon the rule that
answers of a witness upon cross-examination on any irrelevant
or collateral matter are conclusive and binding, and the
witness may not be contradicted or impeached upon an
immaterial or collateral matter of issue.
The Utah Supreme Court in its opinion spoke to the
issue regarding whether or not something is a collateral
matter or issue, stating that "facts v,rhich would be independent:
probable are not collateral."

Wlthin this category the Court

placed facts "which are relevant to the issues" and "facts
independently provable to impeach or disqualify a witness,
whether or not introduced to contradict him. "

The Court

also elaborated on a third type of fact, declaring that it
should have been ad.:ni tted as evidence:
Finallv, a third kind of fact must be
co:-',sidered.- Suppose a \.-i tness has told a story
of a transaction crucial to the controversy.
To prove him wrong in some trivial detail of
ti.-ne, place, or circumstance is "collateral."
But to prove untrue so~e facts recited bv the
wi~ness that if he were reallv there and-saw
what he claims to have seen, ~e could not have
been mistaken about, is a convincinq kind of
impeac~ .. e~t ~ta~ t~e coLrts must Ga~e place for,
al t.'lough -che contracic-c ion e\·ic:icnce lS otherv.·ise
inc.d::-lissible because it .::._s ccllc.~.crc_l c.::.Oer the
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1

is to pull out the linchpin of the story.
So we may recognize this third type of allowable
contradiction, namely, the contradiction of any
part of the v1i tness' s account of the background
and circumstances of a material transaction,
which as a matter of human experience he would
not have been mistaken about if his story were true.
The profferred testimony of witness Riddle was
not impeachment of witness, Harris, on a collateral
issue.
There were two versions as to what occurred at
the Harris' residence.
According to the prosecution
two armed robbers charged into the home, terrorized
the occupants, and took cash from victims Harris and
Bradley.
Narcotics were not present or involved.
According to the defense, no weapons were i~~c:ved,
no cash was taken, two dissatisfied customer:= stole
a bag of narcotics as a culmination of an argument
over the quality of the goods purchased.
Whether
Harris, in fact, distributed narcotics from her
residence was, indeed, a relevant issue in the
case, which defendant was entitled to prove for
a purpose independent of impeaching Harris' testimony;
thus, it was not a collateral issue.
571 P. 2d at 1355

(emphasis added).

Respondent submits that the rebuttal evidence
in the case at bar was precisely the type of facts and evidence
1~ich

the Court referred to in Mitchell.

The facts are practically

identical, excepting the tyoes of felonies involved.

In the

present case the question as to whether appellant kicked another
person in the head during a fight other than the one on which
~e

is standing trial would normally be a collateral matter.

Sue~

is not the c2se,

ha~ever.

Appellant denied kicking the

deceased victim of the crime for which he is on trial.
1tness

A

(Kim Horrocks) was offered prior to such denial testifying
Appellant voluntary brings up on direct

e:-:2~i~a~ion ~~1e £2ct ~}~Et ~e ]~ad been involved in another fight
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he denies having kicked that person in the head during the
fight.

Certainly such a denial by appellant under the rule

in Mitchell, can be impeached on rebuttal by one who was
present on that occasion and saw otherwise.

To rule contrary

would be, as stated supra, in State v. Hansen, to "thwart
the process of justice by preventing the presentation of
any competent evidence to meet any material issue raised.
The material issue being, in the present case, whether
appellant lied when he denied kicking the victim and/or Don
Waltz, when there were eyewitnesses on both occasions who
testified otherwise.
Respondent thus submits that the rebuttal and
cross-examination evidence was properly received in evidence
concerni~

for the purpose of attacking appellant's credibility
a material issue,
an individual

4

that issue being whether appellant kicked

(Oliver or Waltz)

in the head and whether his

denial of such was credible.
D

SAID EVIDENCE \'i'AS PROPERLY RECEIVED
BECAUSE ITS PROBATIVE \'ALUE \~AS NOT
SUBSTF.!\TV"LLY OUT\'JEIGHED BY ANY DANGER
OF Ul\'DCE PP,EJUDICE TO THI: i\PPELLANT.
Pursuant to Rule 45, U.R.E., a trial judge "
may in his discretion exclude evidence if he finds that

4

See also Utah Code _:__nn.
reads in relevant part:

§

78-2.;-l (l()':d), as a;ceTJded, VJinc:_l
iTl ever~· case the ~·

of the \•:i tness may- be C.::::-c_v;n

i :-1

cue.stio:-1 .

~-

co::.tra.c:c-:>
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its probative value is substantially outweighed by the risk
that its admission will .

(b) create substantial danger

of undue prejudice or of confusing the issues or of misleading
the jury.

(Emphasis added.)
Respondent has heretofore explained the probative

effect of adgitting evidence of appellant kicking Don Waltz.
That probative effect must be balanced against any possible
prejudicial effect on appellant.

Such prejudicial

effects could include showing a propensity for
appellant to conunit a certain type of crime,

infla..'":-~'":lation

of

the jury, or misleading a jury to a conclusion that appellant
Such a balancing process

was an evil or bad person.

:ce'"ardi:Jg evidence must be done by the trial judge, Rule 45,
C.".E., and his deternunation thereon should not be disturbed
~~

~~is

Court on appeal unless there is a showing of clear

atuse of that ciiscretion.

State v.

Gibson, 565 P.2d 783,

186-787

(Utah 1977); State v. Pierre, 572 P.2d 1338; rehearing

den:'..ed;

State\' . .;:_ndrev7s,
Respondent

576 P.2d 857

sub~i~s

(Utah 1977).

that not only has appellant

£ailed to show a clear abuse of discretion on the part of the
~ri~l
~a:'..~ed

~udge

rega:cdi:Jg the evidence in question, but has also

to s~cw a:J~ substantial danger of undue prejudice

~e~~ir~C

~nder

Pule

~5.

~or

has he shown that any such

all"'gcod prej;_;dicr= ·,:CJuld sul:lstantially out1-1eigh the already
:Ce~.~: . .c:cratcod ;-.rc:;:::c.ti\·e ._-a~c.:e.

The:cefore, this Court should
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POINT II
THE TRIAL COURT Pi'<OPERLY INSTRUCTED THE JURY
ON THE LESSER INCLUDED OFFENSE OF ~~NSLAUGHTER.
Appellant alleges that the trial court improperly
refused to grant his tendered instruction on manslaughter as
a lesser included offense under three alternative theories
(R.90). 5

The trial court did submit an instruction on the

lesser included offense of manslaughter on alternative theory
A pursuant to Section 76-5-205(a), but refused to submit
alternative theories B and C of manslaughter, as proposed
by appellant.
The State alleged the following alternative theories
of Second Degree
and (c)

5

~1urder

pursuant to Utah Code Ann.

§

76-5-203(t

(1953), as amended, v.•hich were submitted to the jury:

Appellant's theories ~ere offered pursuant to Utah Code
Ann. § 76-5-205 (1953), as amended.
The alternative
theories were that appellant caused the death of Lynn
Oliver under one of the following circumstances:
A.
That the appellant recklessly caused
the death of Lynn Oliver.
B.
That the appellant caused the death of Lvnn
Oliver under the influence of extreme me~tal
or emotional disturbance for which there is
no reasonable explanation or excuse; or
C.
That the appellant caused the ceath of
Lyn!1 01 i ver u!1der c irclffils tc.nce s -,;here
c.ppellant reasonablv believed the circum-

stances :_Jrovided a ffio~al or legal jc.sti::icatiCT"l

or extenuation for his conduct althouqh the
conduct is not legally justifiable or- excusable
under the existing circcmstances.
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(b) intending to cause serious
bodily injury to Lynn Oliver, he [appellant]
committed an act clearly dangerous to human
life that caused the death of Lynn Oliver
or
(c) acting under circumstances
evidencing a depraved indifference to human
life, he recklessly engaged in conduct
which created a great risk of death to
Lynn Oliver and thereby caused the death
of Lynn Oliver.
Appellant's argument centers around the contention
c~at

all of his theories of the case regarding manslaughtsr

should have been submitted to the jury for their

co~siieraclon.

Respondent contends that the instruction on nanslaughter given by the trial court was proper as well as
sufficient, and the only justifiable instruction which could
~a~e

been

~~~-:-__:;e),
~a

s~t~~t

give~

based upon the evidence adduced at trial

~:Jet

c.:-1C.

there \;as ins·J.::Eicien.t evider.ce on which

a?pella~t's

Appella~t

Band C theories on Manslaugher to

cites several cases in support of his

Resoonde~t

i~ ~oto ~as
~·.-_l_SE.~:ce
~~c~~

2~d

submits, respectfully, that the law

not ~roperly been stated by appellant regarding the

~ecessc.r~·
~heories

~his

fer su!J:-:-iss:.c~. of lesser included instrucin Utah.

Court tas

enu~erated

many times the long-

sta:'.:-'i.:cc; ru.'.e of :Cav,· rec;c.rciing ooc:b~issio'' of instructions of
-.~'~

--.c

, ...

c~

a c~s~,

i~cludi~g

submission of lesser
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. . . when parties so request, they are
entitled to instructions on their theory of the
case, including the submission of lesser included
offenses.
However, this is true only where there
is some reasonable basis in the evidence to
justify the giving of such instructions.
State v. McCarthy, 25 Utah 2d 425, 483 P. 2d 890, 891 (1971)
(emphasis added).
499 P. 2d 287, 288

See also State v. Close, 28 Utah 2d 144,
(1972)

(evidence must show some reasonable

basis on which to base defendant's instructions); State v.
Gillian, 23 Utah 2d 372, 463 P. 2d 811, 812

(1970)

(defendant

entitled to have his theory of case submitted if any
reasonable view of evidence would support such a verdict
thereon); State v. Johnson, 112 Utah 130, 185 P.2d 738
(1947)

(defendant entitled to have jury instructed on his

theory if there is any substantial evidence to justify giving
such an instruction thereon).
Though the law is clear that one standing accused
of a criminal charge is entitled to have his theory of the
case presented to the jury via instructions, such is not an
absolute right and will only be enforced where there is a
certain quantllic of evidence available on which to base such
instructions:
It is a basic legal premise that a
defendant in a criminal case is entitled to
have his theory of the case presented to the
jury.
However, the right is not absolute,
and a defense theory must be supported by a
certain quantum cf evidence before an instruction
as to an included offense need be g1ven.
State v. Hendricks, 596 P.2d 633,

634

(Lltah lS'/9).

See
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The "certain quntum of evidence" referred to by
this Court in Hendricks seems to be one of a "reasonable doubt"
standard.

State v. Dock, 585 P.2d 56

Castillo, 23 Utah 2d 70, 457 P.2d 618

(Utah 1978); State v.
(1969).

In both Dock and

Castillo, the defense offered theories of self-defense and
requested instructions thereon.

In both cases the trial court

refused to instruct the jury on the defendant's theories.

In

Dock the only testimony offered was that of defendant himself
when he declared that "he was afraid" and thus actec acccr'iliE?lY
by attacking a prison guard.

In Castillo, the

Cour~

described

defendant's theory of self-defense as "all theory and no evidence,
all shadow and no substance."

The Court elaborated on the

standard to be used when evaluating a defense request for
instruction on a defense theory:
If the defendant's evidence, although
in material conflict ~ith the State's proof,
be such that the jury may entertain a
reasonable doubt as to ~hether or not he
acted in self-defense, he is entitled to
have the jury instructed fully and clearly
on the la~ of self-defense.
Conversely, if
all reasonable men must conclude that the
evidence is so slight as to be incapable
of raisinc a reasonable doubt in the jury's
mind as t~ vhether a defendant accused of a
crime acted in self-defense, tendered
instructions thereon are properly refused.
~S7

P. 2ci at 620

(e::<~hasis

added).

Respondent subffiits that such reasoning regarding the
"reasc"1ai)le doubt" stan6ard in Castillo should be applied to the
If so

C:~e.

~here

is no evidence other than
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appellant's allegations on appeal to support his theories.
A look at the record and the evidence as well as inferences
contained therein reveals no reasonable basis which would
support a conviction of manslaughter based upon appellant's
Band C theories

(Section 76-5-205(b) and

(c)).

Appellant's theory under Section 76-5-205(b) that
he caused the death of Lynn Oliver under the influence of
extreme mental or emotional disturbance for which there is
a reasonable explanation or excuse is strictly theory.
is absolutely no evidence of such in the record.

There

On the

contrary, testimony by eyewitnesses to the fight testified
that appellant, j:lrior to the fight,

seemed to be kidding with

everybody (R.30l-3C2), appeared to be in a good mood (R.302,
333, 490), was buying everybody drinks
himself drinking but vias not drurck

(R.301), and was

(R.30l-302,334).

appellant offered testimony that he was

rna~

The

and drunk on the

night of November 10, 1977, but such is the only evidence
remotely associated with any altering of appellant's
mental state (R.529).
Nor is there sufficiently reasonable evidence to
support a finding of a verdict of guilty of m2nslaughter

6

The standard cf reviev,• of this Court is to "sur\•ev the
whole evidence and the inferences naturallv to be-deduc~
therefrom to see whether there is an reas;nable basis
therein which would suooort a convic ion of the lesser
offenses.
Stat~· v. Harris, 2
Ctah 2d 365, 489
P.2d 1008, lOll (1971).
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pursuant to Section 76-5-205 (c), -,.,hereby appellant claims
that he "caused the death of Lynn Oliver under circumstances
where appellant reasonably believed the circumstances provided
a moral or legal justification or extenuation

for his conduct,"

though such conduct is not legally justifiable or excusable
under the existing circumstances.

Appellant would have this

Court believe that Lynn Oliver's death was "just" the result
of an old bar-room brav;l which got out of hand--"just" a
"mutual combative fisticuffs"

where the participants were

"acting under the influence."

Yet strangely enough, no one

('>,·i th the exception of Kim
appellant,

Horroc'~s),

and especia=.ly

seem to "remember" anything about the fight or the

circumstances surrounding it or ;::-:tat l·:as said, etc.
4 91' 4 9 3 ' 4 96' 4 9 7' 50 0' 50 l' 50 2' 50 3 ' 50 7 ' 50 8 ' 510) .

(R. 488,

Appellant

could not remember what was said during the fight

(R.SOO),

could not remember where he was fighting in the parking lot
( 0"

50:0), could not reme::-,ber 1-,chy :r.e fought 1-1ith Lynn Oliver

(;:;, 5C7),

:all

could not

r~'l'lember

(R. 508), etc.

what caused Lynn Oliver to

In short, appellant did not remember

many of the relevant aspects of that fatal night of November
10,1977.

Yet now on
t~_at

a~peal

he is asking this Court to rule

the trial judae should have instructed the jury to

cr~s~~cr

tis

t~eories

c~

ma~sla~s~ter

of which he can offer
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no recorded evidence.

Case and statutory law

7 .
lS replete

that exclusion of lesser included offense instructions as
well as theories thereon are to be excluded where there is
no evidence to reduce the offense to the lesser grade.
State v. Bender, 581 P.2d 1019 (Utah 1978); State v. Bell,
563 P.2d 187

(Utah 1977); State v. Dougherty, 550 P.2d 175

(Utah 1976); State v. Ferguson, 279 Pac.

55

(Utah 1929).

Pursuant to Section 77-33-6, the jury could have
found appellant guilty of manslaughter based upon appellant's
"A" theory

(Section 76-5-205 (a)); that is, that appellant did

recklessly cause the death of Lynn Oliver.
arguendo, that the j

~ry

This is assuming,

would have found such a theory to be

well founded evidentially, which obviously it did not do
choosing instead to believe the evidence which supports the
state's theory, thereby convictlng appellant of the higher
crime of Second Degree Murder.
Jl.ppellant cites State v. Dougherty, supra, and
concludes that his factual situation is within the scope

7

Utah CoLle Ann. § 77-33-6 (1953), as amencec, states: "T'1e
jur~r rna~- find the defe:~dant cuilt\· of an\· of~ense the
commission of v:':1ich is neces~aril;, included in that ,.,-:_tr,
which he is charged in the ir;dict.~tent or inforr.atior., o: o:
an atterr.pt to cor-unit the offense."
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o::: the c;uide:!_ines set forth therein.

8

He reasons that any

reasonable theory based upon any evidence, however slight,
upon which he could be convicted of the lesser offense
~arrants

giving of the instruction.
Appellant does not come within the guidelines

set forth in the first situation described in Dougherty as
~e

has not produced evidence which would absolve him from

guilt of the second degree murder charge.

The second

situation in Dougherty is not applicable to appellant
because having denied kicking Oliver in the head, and

no~

The three sitautions of which the Utah Supreme Court
spoke regarding the giving of lesser included instructions
c.re:
First, where there is evidence ~hich would
atsolve the defendant from guilt of a greater
of:::ense, or degree, but would support a finding
of guilt of a lesser o::::ense, or degree; the
instruction lS mandator~.
Second, where the evidence would not support
2. ::ir.Cir-.s; oZ quilt ir. t:--:e corrmission of the ies,;er
o==ense or aegree.
For example, the defendant
denies anv comolicitv in the crime charced, and thus
lavs no f~unda~ion f~r any intermediate"verdict; or
1..:~1~:::-e ~~.e elE.~en~s of t::-.e offenses differ 1 and some
ele~ent essential to the lesser offense is either
not proved or shown not to exist.
This second situation renders an instruc=ion on a lesser included
c:=ense erro~eous, beca~se it is not pertinent.
Tr.i::d,

is an

in~er.-·.ediate

situation.

One where

~i~e

ele;-:-,ents of the area-cer offense include all the
c=:_~:-lf2:-.ts cf ~~h1e less..,er cffe::se; because, by its very
~2~~::e,
~~E ~~eater c::::e~se co~ld not have been
co~~~tted ~:,~~1out d~fE~~ant ~a\·inc the intent in
co~nq ~~~ ~~~s. which co~s~itu~e ~~e lesser offense.
::;:::;-; ::::·0c .. c. si::~..c:..ticn i~s-=-ruc-c.ions on the lesser included
c=-=:=::1.se ~.2~- ;___ ::: gi\·en, beca:-.2se all elewents of the lesser
o~~c~sc l1a··e bee~ oro\·ed. Howe~rer, such an instruction
:cc:c:cLc·· :je refused i:" the prosecution has met its
~~:_::_·,.=:\:_':--_ =~ :_,_:··=-<,: o:--. t_~--.--= :-:-ec.-c.er OtfeJ'.se, and there is

--=--~J:_·_'"~~
~, ----:0.~:-:.c~ ":c ::e:=: __lce the qreater offense.
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knowing how or why the victim died, if he was believed by
the jury, he would be guilty of criminal negligence at the
most, probably guilty of nothing at all.

This is so because

if the jury believed the appellant's version of the details of
the fight

(of which he remembers very little), then Kim Horrocr.,\

the only living eyewitness to the kicking

inc~dent

other than

appellant, would have to be disbelieved by the jury.

Thus a

death occurs, but no one can explain how i t occurred, if
Ms.

Horrocks is not believed and appellant believed.

The

third situation does not give credence to appellant's contention, as the prosecution met its burden of proof on the
offense.

great~\

9
Finally, in support of the view that the

prosecut~n

met its burden of proof on the greater offense, once Lynn
Oliver was on the ground, the "mutual combativeness" ended
the moment appellant used his boot to kick Lynn Oliver in t'le
head.

At that moment, appellant brought

hi~

actions and

demonstrated the intent necessary to propel his actions into
the category of Second Degree

~1urder.

Respondent thus respectfully submits that the trial
judge was within his discretion in refusing to give the
appellant's B and C theories regarding manslaLghter.

9

Tr,e couc:t =~,a ..
See also Section 76-1-402 (4), '<ir,ich stateE:
not be obliaated to charge the jury with r ~;::-ect to an
included offense unless there is a rationa
bccsis for a
verdict acquitting the defendant of the of ensc charced
convicting him of the lEcluCed offense.
!I
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c!-,ose not to co:-cvict appellant on the theory of manslaughter
that was offered.

Certainly it has not and cannot be now

shown that the giving of the instruction on appellant's B
and C

~anslaughter

theories would have produced a different

result in the trial.

State v. Bell, supra.

The trial

court's ruling should therefore be upheld.
POINT III
THE TRIAL COURT PROPERLY Il\STRUCTED THE
JURY REGhRDING CREDIBILITY OF THE WITNESSES
Ac'lu THE WEIGHT TO BE GIVEN THEIR TESTIMONY.

Appellant alleges that the trial judge, in
Instruction 3

Co~~~

s

(R.l46), failed to instruct the jury that a

witness's testimony may be impeached and the credibility of
~~e

~itness

thus affected by ''.

or veracity or their opposites."

. his character for honesty
His reasoning is that the

effect of such an alleged omission left the jury with no
~~a~tard

to

deter~ine

~espo~de~t

~rial

court gave

the purpose or weight of such evidence.
SJb~its

that tje instruction which the

(R.l46), covers the material points raised

by appellant affecting credibility.
~he

court is a:-c

o~:-c1bus

~l~~ez~es a~6 t~E
cv2

5~.c:.e

·:. '3allev_·,

we~sht

( l_C-;- 9) '

~'-- •. (_

(' -:..._-'

(__:; .=._ ,_

l

l

l : .

instruction regarding credibility
to be accorded their testimony.

532 P. 2d 407,

:r:~. a rece:-ct case,

The instruction given

411

(l·lontana 1975).

State "''· \·:alker,

24 \·iash.App. 78, 599

:.~e dcfe~da~~-appellant alleged that the

~he

Court of Appeals
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of washington sustained the ruling of the trial judge,
holding that the standard instruction on weight and
credibility to be given the witness was sufficient.
The instruction given by the trial court in the
present case sufficiently instructed the jurors as to how
they were to judge witness credibility:
. You may .
. consider
in accordance with your honest convictions.
what weight and credibility you should give
to the testimony of each witness, measured
by reason and common sense and the rules
set forth in these instructions.
(R.l46).

It is to be noted that appellant's concern regarding
the testimony of John Watson concerning Kim Horrocks'

repu~-

tion in the comnmni ty for truth and veracity is not well
founded,

since Watson was not allowed to testify regarding

such (see Point IV, infra).
There was tl:'.erefore, no error comr:1itted by the
trial judse regarding giving of the instructions or
credibility of witnesses.
POV<T IV
THE TRIAL COURT DID ::OT ERR HJ REoUSit<G TO
.;',LLOW DEFE::s:c 1\-IT:;;::ss JO:C:!; l'i'ATSO~! TO GIV:C
HIS OPINIOF REG_=-.RDil\G ':'HE CHJ'.RL,CTE:" OF
KI!1 HORROCKS FOR TRCT" OR \'E:fu'",CITY.

Appellant offered the testimony of John \'Iatson
regarding Ms. Horrocks' character for purposes of inpeachinc
her testimony.

The

Cou~t

refused to

allo~

sue~~

tE·~~imon~-
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-46-

cue to a lack of proper foundation.
occurred as

The colloquy in question

~allows:

Q.

Have you had occasion to discuss with
people or to her about discussions
concerning Kin Horrocks' reputation for
truthfulness in the community of Lark?
(lvatson):
\vhat was that?
Have you had discussions with people in
Lark or heard discussions with people in
Lark about Kim Horrock's reputation for
truth?
Talk had over her, no.
Whether or not she is a truthful person?

A.
Q.

A.
Q.

A.

No.

*

*

*

(Colloquy between the court and coc.n:;el,
The \Vitness. (\·Iatson):
I have never beer-.
asked about it, you know, never ~o
discussion about it.
Underhill's Criminal Evidence

(Fifth Ed. 1956), at

Section 195 states the mode of proving the general reputation
~:~~c~

~he

accused possesses:
.

.

.

general reputation which the

accused possesses and
ac~~~i~tances, ~~-.- be

e~jo~·s a~ong
sio;~n b~r the

his

testi:-:',c:o:-:::· o:' sue:-,- persc:1s only. The l,·itness
is :::..c t cc:':l;:e::e:--~::. u:-:.less it is first sho\·.~
1

t~2~

~e

k~O\·:s

s~ch

rep~ta~ion,

which must

be =~at ~~ic~ is curre:-:t in the neighborhood
·,,'hEre he and t:-,e accused reside.
If 1vi tness
doEs not know ~here accused lived, he is
inco~petent.

T~1e

~itness

cannot give an

ooinion which is merelv the result of observing
t~e disoosition and co;duct of the defendant.
Khat is-recuired of hi~ is his knowledge
of ~~e exis~lnc oeneral reoutation which he has
o:J~ai:-,ec b\· "'"'~r~:-<c L>e co~'Tlents of others on the
accu:=ec 1:hi:Ce :-,e l~ved a.":lonc those w·ho knew him,
ar.d :.ct :.is o·,;n exclc.sl·,;e personal kno1vledge.
The
~ual~~lC2tion of character witnesses is largely
~i::~~~ ::~e ~~~cre::io~ c~ the trial court.
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It is apparent that Watson was not competent as
a witness to testify regarding Ms. Horrock's reputation for
truth or veracity in the community of Lark as he had not
talked with people in the same community in which she
lived concerning her reputation; thus he had no way of

knowi~

what her reputation consisted of.
The trial court made the proper ruling regarding
the testimony; thus, it should not be interfered with by
this Court.
CONCLUSION
The jury returned a verdict of guilty of Murder in
the Second Degree.

That verdict should not be interfered

wi~

unless there is evidence of prejudice which has occurred in
a substantial manner. State v. Pierre, 572 P.2d 1338; rehearinq
Cienied State v. Andre\·:s,
has alleged
evidentiary

5-;'6 F. 2C. SS/

(Utah 1977).

Appellant

several errors in the proceedings regarding
~atters

Respondent submits

and instructions.

that no error 11c.s been shown by appellant, or in the
alternative that any such error does not raise a reasonable
probability or likelihood that there would have been a
result more favorable to ap?ellant.

Respondent, therefore,

urges affirmc.tion of the judgment of the trial court.
he"pect:':ully sebrr:i tted,
P03ERT B.
~t~orney

H-~~l~SE~\

General
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